Handing every user local admin rights is convenient—until it isn’t. Attackers love excess privilege, and many “it only works as admin” apps keep IT stuck between productivity and risk. Industry analysis shows that removing local admin rights can mitigate a large share of Microsoft’s critical vulnerabilities, historically around 75% of critical CVEs.

This post explains the problem and shows how to plan a shift to least privilege while keeping people productive. In later parts we’ll compare enterprise tools, lighter SaaS options, and where Elevator fits.

The trade-off: convenience vs. risk

• Convenience: users install apps or tweak settings without tickets.
• Risk: malware runs with the same rights users have; misconfigurations spread faster; auditors frown.

Why “privilege elevation” matters

Most users don’t need full-time admin rights. They need specific tasks to run elevated: a legacy line-of-business app, an updater, a driver installer. The goal is simple: elevate the task, not the user. Even Microsoft’s own Endpoint Privilege Management models elevation this way—using rules to proxy an approved executable to run with admin rights while the user remains standard.

Plan before you flip the switch

1. Assess who has local admin today and why (role, app, habit).
2. Prioritize groups for removal (easy wins first, power users later).
3. Pilot on a small, friendly cohort; document breakages and fixes.
4. Prepare support (software portal, remote assistance playbooks).
5. Communicate benefits, timelines, and how to request help.

Dealing with “it needs admin” apps

Legacy apps often need elevation due to writes to protected folders/registry or installing services/drivers. You can:

• Fix permissions (when feasible).
• Use controlled elevation for the app only (our focus in this series).
• Replace/modernize the app (longer-term).

Up next: Part 2 compares heavyweight enterprise suites (BeyondTrust, Ivanti, CyberArk, Quest) and where they make sense—or don’t—for a “just elevate these few apps” need.